This paper focuses on the role of "institutions" in the fight against "poverty", where both poverty and institutions are interpreted broadly. Our view of institutions is in the tradition of New Institutional Economics. It encompasses formal rules designed by polity (including those in the legal and economics sphere such as rules of property rights, contracts and liabilities) as well as informal rules that have emerged over the history of one's civilisation. The inclusion of health, nutrition, and literacy indicators in defining non-income poverty (à la capability approach of Amartya Sen) a llows a rich discussion of policy interventions. While both these orientations as to the concepts of poverty and institutions are expounded on a priori reasoning, empirical analysis with EEFSU data prove rewarding. Quality of institutions (measured here by a composite variable called institutional capital, IC) turns out to be the key factor driving both growth and poverty processes. The income poverty measure (headcount) appears to respond to IC both directly, as well as via growth; institutional quality, however, appears to directly bring about the alleviation of non-income poverty (NIP). Growth does not appear to play much of a role here. A second factor to reckon with is inequality. Initial inequality also has a direct dampening effect on both income and non-income elements of poverty. Consequently we argue that the foremost policy interventions ought to be in the areas of building both adequate formal institutions, reducing existing inequality in resources and in opportunities as well as creating an enabling environment for the informal institutions (such as social capital) to flourish. As in any NIE mode of analysis, the principal focus of the policy debate must centre on the mutual interaction of market as well as non-market institutions in reducing both poverty and inequality. JEL Classification: H1, O1, O2, P5, and Z1
the means by which order is accomplished in relation to which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realise mutual gains" (1998, p76) . Conflicts in exchange may occur due to asset specificity of agents ("bilateral dependency") or wherever contractual hazards (e.g., succumbing to opportunism) may arise.
It is useful to clarify two important aspects of institutions. The NIE literature holds that institutions facilitate transactions both within and outside of the market mechanism. Note that the formal institutions cited above are primarily responsible to allow markets to function smoothly, while typically the informal ones, namely social capital, is the catalyst for non-market transactions. Secondly, is the claim that quality institutions are indispensable for facilitating both ex-ante and expost exchanges. Here again there may be a dichotomy of sorts; clear formal rules (e.g. property rights) ma y suffice in drawing up ex-ante contracts, but eventual sustainability of such contracting over time would require quality monitoring/governance institutions. Clearly some of the latter institutions (e.g., trust and norms) may not be formally coded in the laws of society and hence unenforceable by the polity. However, human interaction may evolve in delivering an informal structure of governance carried out by a civil society structure. The latter would work so long as both parties in a conflict agree to abide by the verdict or face social sanctions, even whence none of which (the verdict or the consequent sanctions) may be part of the formal legal statutes of the land. Ahsan (2003) has introduced the broader term of "institutional capital" (IC), which deno tes the totality of institutions as described above. In other words, IC is inclusive of all formal and informal institutions, and therefore embeds social capital. It also includes institutions of governance, which themselves may be formal as well as informal. Where relevant we would measure how the level of "institutional capital" (IC) as well as its various components may affect economic growth or the poverty profile of the EEFSU region in question.
Within this broad theme, we ask a further question, name ly whether history (as specified by the concept of "path dependence" by Douglass North, 1990a) matters. In the transition context, the latter focus would relate to the evolution of institutions going into the command system following the Second World War. Hence we explore how the selected countries differ in the design, delivery and endowment of institutions. 3 
In particular we would attempt to test a hypothesis implicit in North's thesis (1990a) that history matters, i.e., the growth response to market reforms would depend on the legacy of formal as well as informal institutions inherited by the country in question prior to the socialist rule.
Finally, we probe the interface between broader notions of poverty and IC. Over the past two decades, researchers and policy makers have called for an expansion of the idea of poverty going beyond the income/expenditure dimension. The idea of "basic needs" popularised by the World Bank scholars had been a forerunner. A more vigorous effort started with the popularity of the idea of one's capability as being the relevant measure: poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities than merely as lowness of incomes (Sen 1999, p.87) . Here one attempts to measure how capable is the person to enjoy the kind of life that she cherishes (including basic freedom). Over the decade of the1990s, this concept has led to innovations by the UNDP when it devised the "human development index' in 1993, and finally the "human poverty index" in 1997. Sen believes that this broadening of the concept enables one "to enhance the understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and deprivation by shifting attention away from the means ..to ends that people have reason to pursue, and, correspondingly, to the freedoms to be able to satisfy these ends" (ibid, p90). In practical contexts, one typically selects indicators such as mortality, nutrition, risk/vulnerability, the lack of voice and political participation etc. Below we develop a simple measure of non-income poverty (NIP) along the above lines, and analyse how the quality of institutions (vis-à-vis, say the role of income growth) may affect the evolution of NIP. 4 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief outline of the recent literature on growth and poverty, and relate this to the transition context. We also probe the kind of testable hypotheses that one may derive from this review. Section 3 is devoted to an examination of the conceptual construction of institutional capital (IC) as an integral factor that allows economic (and other) exchanges to take place, thus alleviating market failure. We also explore the a priori scope of differing level of IC among transition countries in explaining the observed difference in their performance over time and contemporaneously. In section 4, we discuss measurement issues especially in light of data availability. Section 5 reviews the empirical findings, while section 6 concludes. The empirical results are described in several tables in the appendix to the paper.
Growth, Poverty and Institutions

(a)
Measuring Poverty: The literature on how to define and measure poverty is extensive. In order to focus attention on the very poor, many agree with Sen (1976) that absolute poverty is what matters. Accepting the latter v iew leads to the idea of expenditure (or income) required to maintaining a socially minimal level of nourishment as a reasonable benchmark. Indeed this is the idea behind the notion of a poverty line. Head count poverty is simply given by H = F(z), where z is the poverty line, and F(y) denotes the cumulative density of income or consumption (y) as the case may be. If we use a discrete distribution function, H then becomes simply (q/n), where q is the number of persons with y = z. Thus H denotes the fraction of population that is "poor". This logic has led the World Bank to popularise the metric of a "dollar (or two) a day" per person as being a rough and ready poverty line. For the EEFSU region, however, the World Bank suggests using $4 (in 1993 international prices) as the appropriate headcount threshold. Indeed the acceptance of the headcount measure provides a foundation for the hypothesis that economic growth matters.
There are of course other measures of absolute poverty. Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT, 1981) introduced a very useful class of poverty indicators, often known as the P α -measure, or simply the FGT measures of poverty:
Or, in discrete terms,
where α ≥ 0, g i is poverty gap (i.e., g i =[z -y i ]i = 1, 2, …,q) of the i-th household. The exponent, α, denotes the index of absolute inequality aversion. The FGT measures satisfy the three Sen axioms (1976).
5 4 More recently multilateral agencies have focussed attention to measuring progress of nations vis -à-vis multidimensional attributes of poverty, hunger, education, health, and the environment known as the millennium development goals (MDGs). 5 These are the focus axiom (i.e., poverty measure must be dependent only on the income/consumption of the poor), the monotonicity axiom (i.e., poverty measure decreases as the incomes of the poor increase) and lastly, the weak transfer axiom (i.e., poverty measure declines whenever the income distribution of the poor improves). See Blackwood and Lynch (1994) for further elaboration.
Further it turns out that the more popular measures discussed earlier in the literature obtain as special cases of the FGT measures of poverty. If α = 0, then P α becomes the head-count ratio:
If α = 1, P α is the head-count times the average income shortfall (I), which is known as the poverty gap (PG) measure:
Similarly the squared poverty gap (SPG), the other well-known measure, is merely FGT with the inequality aversion set at 2:
(b) Growth-Poverty Hypotheses: The received theory of how growth leads to poverty reduction is weak. It is most plausible that the growth process brings about changes in the underlying income distribution. While Kuznets (1963) suggested otherwise, modern evidence indicates that growth may indeed exacerbate rather than abate inequality in its wake. 6 Of immediate focus to the present discussion is the recent observation that greater equality due to continued growth in the already industrialised world (say, OECD) appears to have been reversed in the last 25 years or so. The growth process here operates, Aghion et al (1999) argue, along trade liberalisation, skill-based technical changes, and organisational changes within the firm. The combined force of these diffusions have impacted on growth such as to render the distribution of earnings inequitable, and thus throwing doubt on the plausibility of the Kuznets process under modern contexts.
While development theories have been limited in scope, there has been a proliferation of empirical research on poverty and growth of late. The burgeoning literature dealing with the poverty elasticity of growth essentially started with Datt and Ravallion (1992) , who showed that t he change in poverty, ∆H, between two points in time can always be decomposed into a growth component, and one measuring a change in the underlying distribution. This is mere definitional. The growth part is usually represented by a horizontal shift in the density function with an unchanged distribution, while the distributional change is described for the new level of mean (relative) income.
The poverty elasticity of growth highlighted in the empirical literature focuses on the first of these two components. In that context, Kakwani (1993) had analytically derived an elasticity for all poverty measures that satisfy the FGT class of functions. Since the growth component in the decomposition amounts to a distribution neutral shift (in relative income), the interpretation of the poverty elasticity is simple. The elasticity figure merely yields the number of persons who would cross the set poverty line due to a one-percent increase in mean income.
However one cannot ignore distributional changes. Bourguignon (2002) has recently examined the issue on the presumption that income followed a log-normal distribution, which allows a greater degree of tractability. In effect he characterises the Datt-Ravallion decomposition exactly:
(2.4) (∆H/H) = (-)ε(DEV, IIQ).GRO + β(DEV, IIQ).CIQ.
The notation is as follows. The rhs variables include the per capita GDP growth (GRO), the level of development (DEV, measured by the ratio of mean income to z, the poverty line), initial (IIQ) and the change in inequality (CIQ). 7 The ε-function is the famed (head count) poverty elasticity, which under the conditions of the Bourguignon model, rises with DEV and decreases in IIQ. The distributional change (measured by CIQ) is also accompanied by a coefficient ( β), the poverty elasticity of a change in inequality. The latter itself is a non-linear function of DEV as well as IIQ.
The standard result from the (cross-section) analysis on the subject, typically ignoring the second term in the rhs of (2.4), suggests that economic growth is necessary, even though not sufficient, for income poverty to decline Kraay, 2001a, and Ravallion, 2001 ). Indeed these results suggest that the overall share of output going to the poor remains, on average, largely unchanged with growth. Clearly this process is consistent with a reduction in headcount poverty. However, given initial inequality, the share of the rich in any incremental output may well be many times greater than that going to the very poor. 8 Ravallion (2001) also finds that persistent (and rising) inequality may dampen the poverty elasticity of growth. On balance, however, Chen and Ravallion (2001) have described slow growth itself as the "…far more important reason for the low rate of aggregate poverty reduction than rising inequality within poor economies" (p19).
(c) Growth and Inequality: Modern empirical growth literature suggest that higher initial inequality hurts long-run growth [Alesina-Rodrik (1994) , Perotti (1993 and 1996) , and Persson-Tabellini (1994)], which Aghion et al. (1999) interpret as repudiating the first arm of the inverted Kuznets-U. The type of inequality one has in mind here is along the wealth dimension. These authors argue that the likely explanation behind the result is that wealth inequality influences individual decisions in human and physical capital, especially in the context of capital market imperfections and moral hazard, and hence hurts aggregate growth. Modern (endogenous) growth theories elaborate on this: "..the less developed the credit markets and the larger the separation between borrowers and investors, the bigger the scope of redistributive policies aimed at creating opportunities, improving borrower's incentives, and reducing macroeconomic volatility" (Aghion et al. p.1631). Thus one would infer that high initial inequality would slow down poverty reduction albeit indirectly, namely by slowing down growth. There also remains a concern that the poor typically fare disproportionately worse over economic cycles.
To the extent one interprets the Kuznets hypothesis as suggesting that inequality would promote growth, as some earlier theories had purported to do, current growth analyses (both theory and estimations) would appear to be in direct contradiction. Two predications therefore emerge from the preceding analysis. First is that given moral hazard and incomplete markets for physical and human capital, initial inequality would hurt growth, and thus indirectly (i.e., via growth) retard income poverty reduction. Secondly, insofar as the non-income poverty is directly related to the human capita outcome (e.g., in health and education), initial inequality has a direct bearing on the behaviour of broader poverty. 7 Bourguignon actually measures inequality by the standard deviation (s.d.) of the logarithm of income, but switches to the Gini coefficient in empirical work for both the initial and the change levels. Evidently the Gini is an increasing function of s.d. However, in this paper we use Gini throughout. 8 To consider an illustration, let us posit that each rich (top decile) individual earns $16,000 income annually, while each poor person (in the bottom quintile), gets only $1,000. Further, being consistent with above figures, we take the top decile's initial share as 40%, while the bottom quintile gets only 5%. Then a 30% gain over a ten-year period, distributed proportionately to all groups, implies that the poor ends up with $ 1,300 each vis -à-vis $20,400 for each rich member of society. Of course, this assumes that income distribution had remained unaltered during the growth process.
(d) Institutions and Growth:
Earlier we noted that the entire set of institutional elements aimed at lowering transaction costs would be the conceptual benchmark of "institutional capital" (IC) for our analysis. Insofar as countries (e.g., in transition or developmental mode) suffer from weak institutions, elements such as extensive public control (e.g., via SOEs) and cumbersome regulatory framework combine to lead to high transactions costs thwarting growth. Recently, Rodrik et al (2002) have put forward a strong claim behind this hypothesis. Their empirical analysis finds the quality of institutions to be the primary determinant of long run growth. Comparing three "deep determinants", namely economic integration (say, the trade/GDP ratio), geography (as measured by the distance from the equator) and institutions, they find that "once institutions are controlled for, integration has no direct effect on income, while geography has at best weak direct effects. ..By contrast, our measure of property rights and the rule of law always enters with the correct sign, and is statistically significant with t-statistics that are very large" (p4). This literature therefore suggests that IC would materially affect the growth profile of nations.
(e)
Poverty and IC: The plausibility of a direct linkage between poverty, both measured in terms of income/consumption and in its broader dimensions, and IC especially via income gains is intuitive, though possibly not well documented. Many believe that the peer-monitoring model of micro lending pioneered by the Grameen Bank (GB) in Bangladesh and replicated pretty much world-wide succeeds due to the social capital (e.g., trust within the group, and between the group and the lender) that emerges in an NGO type of setting. The essential idea is that group lending allows the lenders to overcome informational asymmetries typical o f any credit delivery mechanism. Moral hazard and adverse selection are the usual impediments to the functioning of the market in such a context. The principal devices by which the latter are minimised include peer monitoring and social sanctions within the group (and, possibly the local community) working as safeguards against excessive risk taking, misuse of funds, and default behaviour. The above devices work even when the borrower puts up no formal collateral (as in the case of GB). 9 In the NGO mediated micro credit context, the evolving social capital not only allows the participants direct income gains, it also permit additional benefits in health and education contributing to the alleviation of non-income poverty. 10 An important hypothesis then emerges, namely that IC has an independent influence on poverty over and above its effect on growth, which we test in this paper.
(f)
The Non-Income Poverty (NIP): We have already outlined the emergence of a broader conceptualisation of poverty that highlights non-income dimensions prominently. Clearly the various dimensions of poverty interact in important ways. For example, improving health of people increases their income-earning potential, and increasing their education leads to better health outcomes, and so on (Kanbur and Squire, 1999) . It is often argued that the NIP elements, such as health and education, are indeed determinants of income poverty, and hence an exclusive focus on the income dimension is appropriate. While we do not intend on dwelling on this issue here, let us counter the above view by merely noting an example. Surely if education were always to lead to income gains (via the human capital route), counting both income and educational attainment as the measures of well being would have been tenuo us. It should be noted that educational attainment need not, even after a lag, lead tot commensurate income gains due to labour market imperfections (including discrimination along race, gender, ethnicity and the like). Therefore, the rationale for a separate role of NIP (i.e., over and above income poverty) exists at least on account of market imperfections, especially at the input level.
The above review suggests several plausible hypotheses on the evolution of NIP. First is the role of income growth. Modern growth theory also suggests that the initial wealth distribution, which surely affects human capital as well as physical capital investment possibilities and plays a direct role in determining the level of broader poverty. Finally, the literature on institutions implies that the quality of economic, political and social institutions also make for greater access to health, educational, and physical (including public utilities) infrastructure. Hence the levelling of the playing field has a direct bearing in shaping the non-income poverty outcome for a given level of output growth. Overall therefore, we would expect NIP to respond to growth, initial inequality as well as IC.
(g) The Implications for Transition Economies:
The transition dynamics in the EEFSU region has many facets, and we review these briefly here. The transitional process, namely the withdrawal of the command system, and the introduction of market and political liberalisation varied greatly among nations. While all suffered from the recession that followed immediately, the duration and severity differed perceptibly. In Eastern and Central Europe the contraction of output lasted for three to four years and ranged from 20 to 30 percent, while in most CIS countries the output decline was both longer and deeper (Cornia and Popov, 2001, p3) . Hence one of the issues to explain here is how the negative growth affected absolute poverty among the EEFSU countries.
What about inequality? While growth appears to be, on average, neutral with respect to inequality (à la Dollar-Kraay) at a global level, the EEFSU experience stands in sharp contrast. Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient rose dramatically over the decade of the 1990s. 11 Modelling income distribution pre-and post-transition, Milanovic (1999) finds that falling share of wages in disposable income as well as increasing concentration of the emerging wage distribution have caused the Gini to go up. Indeed, the former element alone (and given the large initial weight of wages in the functio nal distribution of income) contributed up to 75% of the increase in Gini for many EEFSU countries. Thus in line with the poverty decomposition analysis, one would expect that, controlling for other factors, countries with the larger increase in inequality to perform poorer in fighting poverty.
What has been the role of institutions?
A key ingredient in the analysis of institutional change is that of path dependence as proposed by Schotter (1981) and by North (1990a) . The latter states " ..if the process by which we arrive at today's institutions is relevant and constrains future choices, then not only does history matter but persistent poor performance and long-run divergent pattern of development stem from a common source " (p93). A clearly verifiable implication of this analysis is that economic performance between two countries would differ even if each were to decree similar formal institutions, but diverge in the quality of informal rules. This is so because the latter is necessary in order "to provide a hospitable foundation for the establishment of formal rules." (North, 1997, p16) . Consequently, one would be tempted to attribute the presumed slow adjustment to reforms in the FSU republics to the lack of quality informal institutions.
Some argue that the socialist state had contributed to the degradation of the civil society and its conventional value system, and replaced that with loyalty to party hierarchy, thereby making it difficult to find the acceptance of the rule of law during the transition phase (Raiser, 2001 ). There are indications that even the role of the institution of family was marginalised in Russia (in sharp contrast to the opposite tendencies in China, see Raiser, . Hence depending on the country in question, one may face a total institutional collapse in the interim or, at least, some functional degree of institutional discontinuity. Indeed one would expect that the Eastern European nations would have faced a milder degree of institutional collapse as they already had experienced, prior to the socialist rule, the market economy, and thus the associated informal institutions could reassert relatively quickly. This then is the essence of the path dependence hypothesis, and indeed it is common knowledge that growth had been hampered less during transition in Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the FSU republics.
How consistent had been the co-ordination of economic and political institutions?
It is relevant to note that not all EEFSU countries have proceeded at the same pace with the process of transition. Kolodko (2000) had observed that Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Kyrgyzstan had been among those to embrace a vigorous transition process. In contrast, Russia and Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria and Romania moved only gradually, often taking steps in the face of fresh crises, hence reflecting a lack of overall strategy. Moreover, the necessary electoral and political changes had been slow, piecemeal, and indecisive in these cases. Such lapses have contributed to poor governance and a lack of credibility in the political leadership of the country.
Did the early reformers suffer the least? Often one belittles the cumulative value of gradual but perceptible changes that were undertaken mainly through economic reforms during the socialist reign. Given that these reforms were undertaken while the state had full authority (i.e., governance by coercion), society had been able to develop appropriate behavioural (supply) response to these measures, and the results have been generally positive. Kolodko identifies Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia as those benefiting the most from pre-liberalisation reforms. Raiser examines the Polish situation closely, and highlights that the value added to gradua l reforms undertaken over the years. One measure of this success is reflected in the fact that by the time the transition began in 1989, the share of non-agricultural GDP in the private sector already stood at 35 percent. Recall that agriculture had never been collectivised in Poland.
In sum we believe that the three factors cited above differentiate the winners from losers in the transition process. To reiterate, these are (a) the degree of institutional continuity, (b) the nature of interplay between economic and wider political reforms, and (c) the head start through reforms undertaken in the pre-transition era. Note that the above is very much an institutional story, one that fits the premise of the path dependence hypothesis most intimately. While difficult to estimate and isolate these elements econometrically, we believe potentially this to be a fruitful approach.
Testable Hypotheses
Let us now collect all the hypotheses (not necessarily mutually exclusive) that emerged from the preceding discussion. Below we shall attempt an evaluation of these with the available data.
Explaining Growth:
The empirical work described below attempts first to explain the growth behaviour. The growth process reviewed above suggests two hypotheses, namely (a) that higher initial inequality hurts growth (growth theory), and (b) that growth depends on IC (NIE, Rodrik et al, 2002 ). Thus we may write:
While the derivatives would have the a priori sign as noted above, we should add that depending on how these are measured and calibrated, the sign pattern of the estimated coefficients would be determined accordingly. We shall review that in the data section below.
Explaining Poverty:
We motivate our econometric specification of the poverty equation as follows. First recall the Bourguignon-Datt-Ravallion identity (equation 2.4 above):
) (∆H/H) = (-)ε(DEV, IIQ). GRO + β(DEV, IIQ). CIQ
We now invoke the hypothesis explaining the change in inequality, which has an old Kuznetsian history as well as a modern growth connotation as reviewed in section 2 above:
Combining (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), we obtain:
Thus once we have utilised the growth-poverty identity described by (3.2), we only find a separate growth variable as associated with increased inequality. Again the postulated sign pattern follows from the current literature as reviewed above; faster growth, higher initial level of development, and a higher quality of institutions all lead to faster poverty reduction, while high initial inequality is an impediment. The interpretation is however is not always direct. For example, the IIQ variable would affect poverty in at least two ways (i.e., even ignoring the second term on the rhs of 3.2), first, directly by lowering the absolute value of the poverty elasticity, and then by influencing growth (as in 3.1). Both these effects happen to reinforce each other. Similarly growth would affect poverty via the standard elasticity (even though we are not utilising the analytical elasticity à la Bourguignon), but also possibly by changing the income distribution. Given (3.3), the stated sign, g 4 < 0 is suggestive of an implicit assumption that the latter effect is dominated by the elasticity effect. Our empirical specification (see Table A .2 and A.3) is essentially a linear approximation of (3.4). 12 
Explaining NIP:
Earlier we have reasoned that initial inequality and poor institutions retard fight against NIP. It is plausible that income growth would also have a positive effect on broader poverty though one may be somewhat ambivalent as to its strength. Advances i n NIP may occur even without commensurate income gains, presumably due to better initial conditions (both at the level of institutional capital as well as in income and wealth distribution). We thus obtain:
Path Dependence (North-Schotter) Hypotheses:
The review undertaken here is strongly supportive of the view that the overall quality of institutional capital surely depends on institutional continuity, a factor that we may measure by a zero-one dummy variable (DUM). In practice, we may fashion this dummy depending on whether the country in question had an episode of market institutions prior to the imposition of communist rule following the Second World War. 13 Hence, 12 Bourguignon has criticised the use of a naked "growth"-term as an independent variable in an equation explaining poverty. He would rather have the theoretical elasticity as a built-in multiplier in the manner of (3.2). Our defence is essentially that we are not merely testing for the "identity check" behind (3.2). Our principal hypothesis is embodied in (3.1). Secondly, even within the decomposition methodology outlined above, it would be presumptuous to impose a function as the logarithmic on a small sample size as we do (15 or 18 observations at this stage). 13 Doubtless there would be a large degree of correlation among the three ele ments of institutional bottlenecks during transition as cited in section 2. Thus absent good and reliable instruments it would be hard to independently examine these all.
(3.6) IC = j(DUM),
In view of the above, we may also restate growth behaviour itself; combining (3.1) and (3.6),
Data Issues
Operationalisation of IC:
Here we focus on conceptually identifying those elements that help lower transaction costs in exchange s among individuals (or groups, as appropriate). Further we group the former into three convenient categories, i.e., (i) those lowering the costs of information and communication, (ii) those supporting market competition, and, finally (iii) those strengthe ning social capital.
(i) Information and Communication Costs: The quality of the information regime (e.g., informationcommunication technology at public's disposal) has a direct influence on the efficacy of exchanges. Possible indicators include the extent of the transportation network, (especially, rural, and around the main production and market centres), rural energy supply, and the telecommunication system (both wireless and conventional). The degree of computerisation (e.g., as measured by the number of diploma holders or the export value of software) is another element. Decentralisation (administrative and fiscal) allows rural residents easier access to local public goods, and this may be viewed as lowering the communication costs than in a unitary system of government. 14 The share of local govt to national revenue may be taken as a rudimentary measure of decentralisation. Unfortunately consistent data on the elements cited above are not available for the EEFSU countries.
(ii) Market Competitiveness: Quality of public expenditures in health, education, and in physical infrastructure, and the availability of credit are critical to render markets for labour and that for credit to perform better. At the same time, formal institutions such as the legal/regulatory framework, bureaucracy, the justice system (e.g., independence, corruption and law enforcement), and bank supervision are just as significant. Again data on many of these are hard to assemble for a group of countries. The following elements, on which data is generally available, may therefore be taken to gauge the level of market competition instead.
Rule of Law (ROL):
While this factor is cited as one of six indicators of "governance" by the World Bank Institute (WBI), we treat this as part of the formal institutions as spelled out in section 2 above. The original WBI information was based on a survey of perceptions of the quality of governance carried out during 1997 and 1998, and has since been updated in 2001 (WB, 2001).
Corruption: Control of corruption (COC) may be seen as helping markets to function (e.g., in the process of bidding and allocation of public contracts, allocation of credit, of public sector employment, career advancement and the like). Pervasive corruption typically stands in the way of private firms getting established and flourishing.
(iii) Social Capital: This paper highlights the role of informal institutions as strengthening or even supplanting the market mechanism. While ideally, one would wish to have data on trust in society (among each other, among groups, and between individuals and branches of government and judiciary), the extent of networking, and participation in voluntary and civil activities, this is not feasible at this time. 15 While some authors (e.g., Inglehart, et al., 1998) have compiled measures of social capital for a number of countries, this is most inadequate for the sample of countries in focus here. Thus in the absence of direct observation on trust, variables such as micro credit availability, density of NGO and other voluntary agency activities, and wireless telephony (critical to rural group co-ordination and networking) may be valuable. Unfortunately even the latter variety of information is not available at the cross-section level.
We finally adopt two more of the "governance" elements compiled by WBI as indicators of social capital in society. These are (a) political stability/lack of violence (PLS), and (iv) voice and accountability (VOA). While the second of these would appear to reflect strong civil society, social cohesion (and hence trust) may be associated with the lack of violence. Of course, both these components may also emerge primarily out of good governance and monitoring institutions. The point however remains that without a vocal and active civil society, monitoring is usually poor.
To sum up the discussion on IC, let us note that many of the broad features we have discussed above are not available for the present analysis. For future reference, we nevertheless enumerate these in the form of a schema (Figure 1 ) in the appendix to the paper. We are thus led to relying on available data, and in that context, we select four indicators derived by the WBI governance project cited above. 16 We have chosen (i) control of corruption and the (ii) rule of law as measuring the quality of formal institutions, while (iii) political stability/lack of violence, and (iv) voice and accountability proxy for social capital indicators. 17 We construct an aggregate IC variable based on the data on the four selected WB indicators of the quality of institutions described above. Each individual country observation, under each category, was given a score between 1 (best) and four (poor) according to the quartile where the observation fell in the distribution. These ordinals were then added up to form an equally weighted aggregate measure ('weakness of institutions') of IC. The latter record may, by construction vary between 4 (e.g., Estonia, Hungary and Poland) and 16 (Kyrgyz Republic). Given that these ordinals fall as the quality rises, the variable is itself labelled DIC (decrease in institutional capital). 18 The above WB data may be contrasted with the Freedom House (FH) index of political and civil rights (as used by Rodrik and Persson-Tabellini in related work). Indeed we develop an aggregate index (again, a weighted average) out of the three FH indices of political rights, civil liberties and the status of freedom, and call it PCF. This is done for two data points, 1973 and 2002, the difference is labelled DPCF, which measure the evolution of rights and liberties over the thirty-year period.
In order to measure the role of international institutions, we consider the value of investment made by EBRD in the transition countries. This may also be viewed as measur ing the scope of integration in the present context. We have figures on the cumulative EBRD investment from 1990-2001 for the present sample. These have been normalised by population size (per hundred thousand), and the resulting figures are in units of hundred thousand dollars. This variable is labelled EINV.
(e) Operationalisation of Non-Income Poverty:
Recall that here we would ideally measure the output of the economic game that has a bearing on broader poverty over and above the income/consumption aspects. In terms of the capability approach, we note that, deeper aspects of voice and freedom are harder to quantify, but access to inputs and information would however be consistent with the goal of maximising the capabilities. 19 Consequently, we focus on (i) female literacy (measured by gross secondary enrolment), health status of the very young, particularly, (ii) infant mortality and (iii) low birth weight, and (iv) longevity. Literacy and child (or, maternal) health developments may result from deliberate public policy and formal rules of society (e.g., compulsory attendance in school to a certain age or widely available public health facilities). Or, these may derive from civil and public varieties of social capital (social support and networking) or a combination of both formal as well as informal institutions. In any event, it may be noted that the elements cited above indicate the outcome on the human capital side, and thus the physical capital accomplishment is slighted in this construction. While it is not difficult to provide a conceptual measure of the latter (say the interest rate differential between rural credit and the commercial sector lending rate), observability is the dominant constraint.
(f) Comparable Data: Even though the world is faced with the threat that poverty eradication is going to be a hard fought battle for years if not decades to come, there is still little consensus about practical definitions which could yield comparable estimates from household survey data across countries. As a result, the attempt to gather information and data regarding the level of poverty among the EEFSU group is endangered by the risk of inconsistency in characterizing the poverty line adopted by different international organizations. In any event, the income poverty data that we use in this paper is gathered from UNDP and a World Bank paper by Milanovic (1998) , which describes the $4/day poverty line in the same way as UNDP's Human Development Reports (HDR). Therefore, we were able to combine both the data sets (i.e., WB and HDR), as they are mutually consistent. We should note in principle that the relative prices (of non-tradables) can vary a great deal among countries, and hence the international measure need not adequately describe the underlying differences in poverty among countries. For the present group though such anomalies are unlikely to be serious.
While the present study covers the post-liberalisation period (namely, 1988-2000/01), it is necessary to have observations at the pre-transition stage (say as of 1987/88). The idea is to capture the "longer-term", effects, there being the presumption of a lag over which the transition/liberalisation process would settle in. However, the latest year for which comparable data is available is 1999, and hence our longer term poverty performance covers the change in headcount poverty between 1987 and 1999, for which we have only 15 countries. We also examine the immediate poverty increase during the transition, and this is captured by examining the poverty behaviour over the shorter span of 1987-1995, which yields a sample of 18 countries.
The remaining data relate to GDP growth, inequality and broader poverty measures cited above. These are all taken from the latest World Development Indicators (2002), which applies a consistent methodology.
Empirical Evidence
Here we briefly outline our empirical observations on the process of growth, inequality and on the evolution of poverty based on the data set constructed for the present analysis. All regressions discussed here utilise the OLS procedures, where the standard errors and the F-statistics have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. 19 See also Rodrik (2000) . 20 The figures in the parenthesis underneath the estimated coefficients are the t-values.
Growth:
Focussing on annualised GDP growth rates over the reference period, 1990-2000, EEFSU average growth has b een negative, indeed the only region to have this distinction. Ivaschenko (2001) noted the pace of de-industrialisation as a significant fact of the recent economic history of the region. WDI 2001 data reveals that the overall industrial decline had been at the annual rate of 6.6 percent over the decade of the 1990s for the group of countries in focus here. Of these, notably Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine recorded the worst industrial decline (average of 14 percent annually), and these were indeed the countries where output decline was the steepest (annual average of 9.2 %). Agricultural losses, while less steep, were more uniformly distributed vis-à-vis the overall decline in GDP.
What can this body of data tell us on the growth process? Based on the results reported in Table  A .1, both the Akaike and Schwartz information criterion suggests that regression (2) fits the data best, although (6) is very close behind. We find that a weakening of the institutional capital leads to a decrease in the growth rate. However the control of corruption (COC) rather than the aggregate DIC appear to be the key variable driving not only regression (2), but also those just behind, namely (5)-(7). These indications are entirely consistent with the tenets of NIE, and, even if preliminary, is an interesting vindication of our hypothesis (equation 3.1). We should emphasise that while DollarKraay (2001a) found a mild support for the role of "rule of law", we find a rather robust coefficient for COC.
Does the initial level of inequality (IIQ) affect growth in the tradition of the evidence compiled, among other, by Alesina-Rodrik (1994) ? According to equation (2), the role of the initial (i.e., as of 1988) level of inequality on the growth performance over the period 1990-99 is rather muted, though the sign is correct. Unfortunately, the COC (and indeed all IC components) are highly correlated with IIQ, and thus unless we find a good instrument for one of these two variables, a more reliable estimation would remain elusive. It i s also conceivable that in a larger data set, the correlation would be smaller, and hence more manageable. Further note that, in the absence of wealth distribution, we have used income/expenditure data in measuring initial inequality. To what extent the income data would have tracked the initial wealth distribution for the EEFSU region remains unknown.
We also test for the role of international institutions, namely the relative size of the EBRD investment over the past decade (i.e., the EINV variable) as seen in (4), (5) and (7). In regression (4) this variable is highly significant. In the sample of 18 countries, EINV is un-correlated with any other independent variable.
In order to test equation (3.7) spelled out above, we have created a dummy variable to distinguish the EEFSU countries according to whether they had market institutions (DUM = 1) pre-communism or not (DUM = 0). However, this too is highly correlated with IIQ (-0.63), thereby precluding a reliable test. Hence there again arises the necessit y of viable instruments.
Explaining the Rise in Inequality:
As the sample EEFSU economies were very much in transition causing great dislocation in the economic lives of citizens, the context matches, perhaps a bit too dramatically, the early modernisation phase envisaged by Kuznets. Has the underlying growth contributed to the rampant rise in inequality? Estimating the above relationship we obtain: Contrary to the early phase of the Kuznets process, the relationship is negative, i.e., growth seems to dampen the rise in inequality. To the extent, the quintile measure (namely the share of income accruing to the poorest quintile) used by Dollar-Kraay (2001a) is related to the Gini, the latter find no systematic effect of growth on inequality. 21 Plausibly the dislocations due to the massive loss of jobs and high internal migration (frequently from urban to rural areas) may have caused much too turbulence to allow stable behaviour vis-à-vis the standard view of early industrialisation. However we do have to keep in mind that the above is an incomplete specification, where growth only explains a fraction of the total variability in the change in inequality.
Explaining Income Poverty
As discussed above, here we focus on the income poverty figures based on the international measure (i.e., four dollars-a-day). At this level significant poverty persists in all but a few cases (namely Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia). While poverty rose dramatically soon after the start of liberalisation, the high variability in the change in headcount poverty figures, especially over the longer horizon, namely 1987-1999 is striking. The dramatically high poverty figures as of 1999 for Kyrgyz Republic (88%), Moldova (82%) and Kazakhstan (62%) remain a matter of grave concern.
Poverty Performance in Early Transition, 1987-95:
Examining poverty data early in the transition phase reveals that the population living below four dollars a day increased from very low levels (mostly in the single digit) to a range where in eight out of 18 countries, the headcount poverty rose over 50%). Table A .2 reports the main results, where regression (7) leads the pack, followed by (2) and (5) . In all these cases, g rowth of output is indeed the primary variable of interest. Alone it explains about 60% of the variability in the independent variable (see eq. 1). The leading regressions each has IIQ as a significant explanatory variable. GRO and IIQ together explain ove r 75% of the variability in headcount poverty behaviour over the 1987-1995 period. In regression (7), CIQ also features and is of borderline significance. Overall this regression fits the theory well as described by equation (3.4) .
Notwithstanding the i mportance of growth, the institutional quality is perhaps the single most variable of significance as equation (3) in Table A2 would suggest. On a direct comparison between (1) and (3), it is seen that the aggregate indicator of institutions, DIC, alone explains 70% of the variability in poverty in the early transition phase. Econometrically however it is rather difficult to isolate effects of IC variables from that due to growth or indeed the level of initial inequality. Both the latter variables are correlated with DIC (Table A5) . One component of DIC, namely PLS, is not as highly correlated with growth (the coefficient being 0.5), but is still robustly correlated with IIQ (-0.64). This explains why PLS turns out to be statistically insignificant once we add IIQ in the set of regressors (compare equations 6 and 7 in Table A2 ). This difficulty therefore calls for an instrumental variable approach. Unfortunately, however, the data set at our disposal does not yield satisfactory instruments for the set of highly correlated variables (namely IIQ, DIC or its components).
Poverty over 1987-99: Looking at the longer horizon, note that regressions (3), (4) and (2a) in Table  A2 are, respectively, ranked first to third using the AIC indicator. 22 All have GRO as an explanatory variable, and the estimated growth elasticity of poverty is significant except in (2a). It is of interest to compare the present result of the importance of growth, obtained largely in a regime of negative growth, to the corresponding estimates in the literature that mostly deal with more diverse growth histories. Let us first observe that the above finding is indeed consistent with the well-known results of Dollar and Kraay (2001a) and Ravallion (2001) . Using panel data (covering the last f our decades) for 80 countries (developed and developing), Dollar-Kraay found that there was indeed a one-to-one relationship between annual per capita GDP growth and the income accruing to the poorest quintile, even though there was a fair bit of variation around the average relationship. Ravallion (2001) uses (dollar-a-day poverty) data for 47 developing countries (over the 1980s and 90s), and discovers that his results echo that obtained by Dollar and Kraay (2001a). Ravallion's growth coefficient of (-) 2.5 (t-value of 8.3) may be interpreted as suggesting that "for every one percent increase in the mean, the proportion of the population living below $1/day ..falls by an average of 2.5%" (p9).
What is perhaps striking is that for a sample of 15 countries, we get similar and almost as robust results for the EEFSU region. Quantitatively, the coefficient for the four-dollar poverty is of the same order as that found by Ravallion and other authors of the same tradition. In our case, the poverty elasticity of growth is seen at -3.03 (t = -2.13), which is reduced slightly (-2.64, t = -1.89) when we add VOA, a IC variable. Given that the average growth, indeed an average contraction of 3.5 percent in the present case, the growth coefficient cited above suggests that were policy reforms to fully reverse the contraction (i.e., zero growth of output on average), population below the fourdollar poverty would have fallen from the average figure of 29 to 18.5 percent. This would appear to be a dramatic decline indeed. 23 The above observation is also consistent with specific experiences of the few countries that were indeed able to register positive growth over this period. Hence Ravallion's suggestion that "there is no sign that distributional changes help protect the poor during contractions.." appear to be confirmed by the EEFSU data.
Inequality and Poverty:
Previous research has shown that even though growth and poverty reduction goes hand in hand, the share of income going to the poor (however defined) remains largely independent of the growth rate of GDP. However given initial inequality, this suggests that the rich (say the top quintile or so) must have gained proportionately more since the poor's share is about constant in any growth. The IIQ variable does yield the correct sign in our regressions, and is highly significant. Bourguignon's derivation suggests that the absolute value of the elasticity should be decreasing with higher initial inequality. Comparing regressions (1) and (1a), we do confirm this prediction. Empirically, Ravallion (2001) found that rising inequality did dampen the poverty performance of growth. Here we also detect a support behind this prediction as the poverty elasticity falls in eq. (4) vis-à-vis eq. (3b).
While in our data set, the initial inequality was about uniform (average Gini coefficient of 23.5, and s.d. of 1.63), unlike other regional data, inequality by the end of the nineties had increased by an average of nine percentage points, reaching a figure of 32.4 . Hence with increased inequality the poor's share of income must have declined commensurately. However, whenever we add the actual change in inequality (CIQ), results do not improve markedly. For example, when we go from eq. (1a) to (1b), or from eq (3b) to (4), the statistical fit improves in each case, but the coefficient of the CIQ term fails to be significant. By contrast whenever we replace IIQ by CIQ, the quality of fit suffers as the CIQ variable continue s to remain statistically not significant. 24 It would thus appear that, at least in this data set, the initial level of inequality is a more potent determinant of poverty outcome than is the actual change in inequality over the growth phase. This ambivalence is also 23 The dependent variable in the regression line we fitted was the change in the percentage of people below the poverty line over the period 1987-99. Thus for the reversion of the contraction rate of 3.457 percent throughout the entire decade would have caused poverty to decline by 10.5 percentage points. The average $4 poverty rate stood at 29.1 percent as of 1999-00. 24 This result is not reported in Table A3 , however. reflected in the data. Looking at specific cases, we see that Russia with the steepest rise in inequality, registers a large increase in the poverty rate. By contrast, Estonia having witnessed a sharp rise in inequality (worse than in Moldova or Ukraine) escapes much poverty due to its robust growth in the late nineties. Hence the present episode of growth-RIQ interface would suggest that rising inequality might plausibly constrain growth [see eq (1) in Table A .1], and thus lead to a worsening of poverty, but has only a limited little independent effect once the growth effect has been taken into account.
Institutions and Poverty:
Previous empirical studies generally failed to detect any discernible impact of institutions on poverty, or indeed of elements such as the openness of the economy, which may be viewed as growth friendly. Dollar and Kraay (2001b) find negligible correlation between changes in inequality and greater openness. It is of interest therefore to note that in the present study, the quality of institutions does matter. A decline in institutional quality worsens the poverty outcome. Both VOA (regression 4) and DPCF, a measure based on the Freedom House indicators, (regressions 3 and 2a), appear with statistically significant coefficients. Indeed comparing equations (1) and (2) it is evident that DPCF alone explains a larger share of poverty increase over the period 1987-1999 than growth alone. Indeed the poverty elasticity of growth diminishes greatly as DPCF enters as a second variable (see equations 1 and 2a). However, as discussed earlier, we are hand icapped by the lack of data which may allow the identification of valid instruments for several of the explanatory variables, particularly in the IC category.
The broad conclusion on the behaviour of income poverty must be that initial inequality and the quality of institutions largely drives poverty reduction. While growth materially affect the latter process, once the former variables are controlled for, GRO fails to remain highly significant on a consistent basis. This is remarkably different than the conclusion reached by authors such as Ravallion (2001) .
(e) Non-Income Poverty: We focus on an aggregate indicator, NIP, which accords equal weight to four elements for which we have comparable data, namely, life expectancy, infant mortality, female primary enrolment, and the incidence of low birth-weight babies. On female primary enrolment, we note that there has been sizeable advance in all countries. Judging by the incidence of low birth weight of babies (1992-98), we see that the Baltic countries boast of the best record (at four percent which is well below the regional average of seven). Turning to infant mortality figures, again there has been a general reduction, although the regional average is rather high.
Analysing NIP, let us focus on the best fit, namely regression (3). We find that neither GDP growth nor the rise in inequality (i.e., CIQ) is successful in the explanation (Table A4) . 25 While GRO by itself is highly significant, it does not explain a lot of the variability in NIP. By contrast, the institutional variable, DPCF, has about twice the explanatory power (see equations 1 and 4). A focus on DPCF is interesting since it has the least correlation, followed by VOA, among all domestic IC variables vis-à-vis growth. However, given DPCF, as we add GRO, not only the added coefficient becomes insignificant, the resulting equation is dominated by one with DPCF alone on all goodness-of-fit criteria shown in Table A4 (see equations 4 and 5). As equation (3) demonstrates the DIC components such as COC perhaps explain the behaviour of non-income poverty best in the present sample. The level of initial inequality is also highly significant, and it is fortuitous that IIQ has the least correlation with COC among all IC variables. We thus find that non-income poverty improves with better control of corruption, as well as with less unequal initial income distribution. This is largely consistent with the finding on income poverty over 1987-99.
The relevance of institutional capital is quite evident; elements such as effective control of corruption, rule of law or public accountability do make for greater access to public resources (be in health, education or infrastructure) to all citizens. Lower initial inequality also plays a similar role; it serves to complement the public resources that are available. Correspondingly, where public facilities are highly inadequate, personal wealth becomes indispensable thus causing great disparities in access to physical and human capital.
A recent paper by Moser and Ichida (2001) analyses several aspects of non-income poverty for a sample of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In particular they consider life expectancy, infant mortality and primary school enrolment, all of which are essentially included in our construction of NIP. They find that the positive effect of income growth on life expectancy, school enrolment, and the decline in infant mortality are all robust as confirmed by OLS, GLS and 2SLS methods of estimation. They further infer that there is no evidence of reverse causality it this sample since they find that changes in the non-income poverty elements do not lead to significant gains in income. They also find that lower income inequality has an important role to play in the reduction of nonincome poverty. These findings are largely consistent with those presented above. However as we pointed out, the importance of income growth fades once institutional factors are brought to bear on the explanation, a feature that is absent in the Moser-Ichida analysis.
To recap the above discussion, we observe that the transition from the communist to hybrids of market institutions has led to the challenge of adaptation to the new mode of doing business. Some nations were better prepared, due to their earlier experience with the market, and especially those who were able to retain the vestiges of informal institutions commensurate with the market (and intuition about them) than others. Hence the manner in which IC has been fashioned over the past decade or so provides the dominant explanation behind the growth process, and in its wake, the resulting poverty dynamics both in income (albeit indirectly, via growth) as well as in non-income dimensions. Indeed, it is the latter effect that has been the most dramatic, overshadowing the standard explanation based on the prominence of growth or the rise in inequality over time.
Conclusion
The primary goals of this paper has been to examine the EEFSU growth experience (1987-99/00), for the sample of 18 countries, and attempt to discern the scope of the quality of institutions in affecting economic growth and poverty. This was to be carried out in terms of an expanded model of poverty decomposition popularised by the work of Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Bourguignon (2002) , where we had build in an integral role of institutional capital. Secondly, we wished to focus on the some key indicators of non-income dimensions of poverty, and examine the differences in its behaviour among countries in terms of the underlying institutional capital, economic growth, and the distributional characteristics.
Our preliminary findings may be restated very briefly. The institutional variable appears to have a most emphatic role in explaining growth, while at the same time rising inequality may indeed dampen growth. Unlike other researchers on the topic, we do not find an overwhelming importance of growth in influencing income poverty reduction, especially over the longer horizon. Growth however is highly significant for the poverty early in the transition phase, i.e., to 1995. Initial inequality is another important variable in poverty reduction, both income and in non-income dimensions. When it comes to non-income poverty, however, economic growth does not at all figure in the explanation. The primary role is that of institutional capital, though an independent role of initial income inequality also appears to be robust.
In terms of the related literature, we note that there is little direct evidence on broader measures of IC, especially as they relate to the issues of poverty and inequality. There have however been attempts to address selected aspects of the phenomenon, chiefly democratisation, rule of law and corruption especially as they may affect economic growth. Closest perhaps to our interests is the finding by Dollar and Kraay (2001a) that rule of law had a positive impact on growth. Rodrik et al (2002) found that the rule of law explains income growth better that other "deep" determinants such as geography or the scope of international integration (say as measured by the trade/GDP ratio). We experimented with several indicators of the IC and found the corruption variable to yield more precise estimators in the EEFSU case. Somewhat afield, Persson and Tabellini (2001) examined the effects of the democracy type on the fiscal outcome (e.g., size of the public sector and the nature of fiscal interventions). In terms of non-income poverty, ours appears to be the first effort to explain this behaviour empirically.
Data inadequacies afflict researchers in the type of analysis undertaken here, and especially so in the context of the transition countries. While we detected a most prominent role of institutional quality in determining growth and poverty, most indicators of IC we had access to happen to correlate highly with the initial level of inequality, another key variable in the analysis. It is therefore of utmost importance to discover additional data sources that may yield valid instruments so that adequate econometric analysis may be carried out. It would be important to isolate the relative domains of inequality and that of institutional quality in the explanation of growth. Likewise, for the overall strategy for poverty reduction, we need to isolate the separate influences of growth, inequality and IC. Economic integration or the international aspect of institutions also has a potential role in poverty reduction and in generating faster growth, and here also data issues prevent a full analysis.
What can we infer on the direction of policy reform for poverty eradication? While growth does not consistently appear to have the designation of the primary determinant of poverty, income or nonincome, as earlier studies (using broader data sets) have claimed, it nevertheless is a necessary goal. We also find evidence that rising inequality hurts growth. Polices must therefore promote distribution friendly growth. The later surely calls for a stable macro environment (i.e., low budgetary deficits and low monetary expansion)
Further we find that EEFSU data empirically supports the potential importance of the quality of institutions and the initial level of income inequality in both fostering growth and in reducing poverty (income and non-income). Hence not only must we ensure that growth is distribution friendly, there may well be a scope for well-targeted and sustainable public transfer schemes (e.g., social insurance). Harnessing the information technology, and the design of efficient worker training incentives (e.g., via the tax system) targeted at skill acquisition would also appear relevant.
In so far as non-income poverty is concerned, policy interventions such as the promotion of selfemployment (say via group-based micro lending), which over and above direct income generation (and thus help fight income poverty), are widely believed to permit group members more effective utilisation of social capital. The latter externality is believed to lead to advances in non-income dimensions of poverty (e.g., health, sanitation, literacy and numeracy). Of course, deliberate NGOcivil society initiatives in these areas, with or without the contrivance of micro credit, may also speed up these goals by allowing a broader access to the rural people, and thus partly offset historical differences in initial conditions. Public authorities must therefore encourage free and unhindered initiatives by such organisations, which often appear efficient in the local provision of educational and health services that private markets alone are unable to fully allocate. *** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 1% level of significance ** t -statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 5% level of significance * t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 10% level of significance NS-not significant
